Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

[Law] Urban Transportation Security

October 1991                                                      

               URBAN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY                             


                       Robert W. Dart                         
                     Gang Crimes Section
                  Chicago Police Department                          

     Urban transit systems are the very lifeblood of
metropolitan areas.  They preserve our cities as vital
commercial centers.  Their lines carry citizens to and from
their places of work, as well as to educational, recreational,
and cultural facilities.

     Unfortunately, however, many citizens perceive that their
personal safety is endangered on urban transit systems because
they believe that dangerous levels of crime exist in subways.
For many riders, descending into the noisy, disorienting
subterranean world of rapid transit increases their fear of

     Also contributing to the false perception of danger is the
reaction of the media to incidents that occur on subways.  Even
though only about 5 percent of Chicago's total crime occurs on
the Chicago Transit System, the media tend to publicize these
crimes, while seeming to ignore these same types of crime when
they occur on the streets.  This action only serves to reinforce
the belief that subway transit is unsafe.

     Because citizens believe this to be true, and because
citizen perception of security affects volume and revenue, (1)
officers who police these systems must now incorporate into
their normal duties the critical task of changing citizen
apprehension about using a subway transit system.  Riders must
not only be safe; they must also feel safe.  Using the Chicago
Transit System as a case study, this article discusses possible
strategies that departments can use to reduce crime on urban
transportation systems, thereby changing citizen perception.

THE PROBLEM                                                       

     The Chicago Transit System (CTA) operates over 1,000 cars
that transport approximately one-half million persons daily.  It
has over 140 stations and over 200 miles of track that are
policed by the Public Transportation Section of the Chicago
Police Department.

     Future plans for the CTA call for an additional 9.2-mile
stretch of line to connect the existing loop to Midway Airport.
However, since local citizens and tourists arriving at the
airport will not use a system they believe to be unsafe, the
City of Chicago was confronted with the dilemma of how to police
the city's public transportation system more effectively.


     To begin, officials reviewed the nature and scope of crimes
committed on the transportation system.  Their goals were to
find possible solutions to these crime problems, and at the same
time, change the public's belief that subways were unsafe.

     However, reducing the rate of crime required an organized
effort--a bandaid approach would not be effective.  It was
necessary to reorganize totally in order to establish a program
with new goals and direction.  Officials wanted to make a clear
commitment to the safety of the ridership.

Areas Addressed


     A primary consideration in the reorganization was how to
deploy personnel efficiently.  Based on studied needs, transit
personnel are divided among three watches.  The first shift
(midnights) receives 23 percent of the personnel, the second
shift (days) receives 34 percent of the personnel, and the third
shift (afternoons) receives 43 percent of the personnel.  In
addition to patrol personnel, each 8-hour shift includes a
canine unit, a tactical unit, and a crime assault team (CAT).
These special units are deployed to any problem areas that need
their specific skills.

     Patrol squads

     Because it was not effective to assign police officers to a
designated stretch of track during periods of low crime or low
ridership, the squad concept was born.  This concept is designed
around first-line supervisors (sergeants), who deploy all or
part of their teams to high-crime platforms during certain times
and then to other platforms during peak ridership.  This
enhances the citizen perception of safety by increasing the
presence of uniformed police officers.

     At any given time, the transportation section has as many
as 10 squads assigned to different areas of the transit system.
A typical squad consists of four to six uniformed officers, two
plainclothes officers, and two canine officers, who are separate
from the canine units.  Although users of transit systems
commonly believe that plainclothes officers combat crime most
effectively, riders are not at ease unless they also see
uniformed officers.  And, because both plainclothes and
uniformed officers can make arrests, officials are able to
achieve a balance of visibility and productivity.

     Canine units                                                      

     Canine units are also used to police the transit system.
The dogs, which are donated by citizens, are given 8 weeks of
intensive training in aggression, protection of their handlers,
and moving safely among crowds.  Canine units not only give
transit users a greater sense of safety but they also reinforce
positive public relations.  Riders look forward to seeing their
dogs and seem to take a personal interest in them.

     Tactical units

     Tactical units, which have the flexibility to be deployed
to any situation or crime pattern, play an integral part in the
effort to reduce the crime rate.  These plainclothes officers
can move freely through the system without arousing the
suspicions of potential offenders.  They observe all transit
criminal activity for patterns, such as time of day, day of
week, and modus operandi.  Personnel in the unit then devise a
plan to address specific crime problems.

     For example, thieves and pickpockets are a major problem on
transit systems.  Most of them ply their trade during rush-hours
and during lunch times, when the subways are crowded.  However,
because CTA tactical units target these thieves, the problem has
been greatly reduced.

     Crime assault teams

     The crime assault teams consist of experienced police
officers who exhibit a high degree of self-discipline and are
team players.  They pose as ordinary transit users and wait for
criminals to take advantage of their apparent vulnerability.  In
order to avoid a charge of entrapment, these officers react only
when they have been victimized.

     During the trials of these criminals, the victim/officer
testifies as the complainant, and a crime assault team member
testifies as the arresting officer.  These two factors
contribute to an extrodinarily high conviction rate in these

     Ordinance enforcement team

     Another major problem the CTA experienced was unlicensed
vendors.  Prior to the new program, these illegal vendors were
issued ordinance complaint forms or citations similar to traffic
citations.  However, because this method of enforcement provided
no assurance that offenders would appear in court to answer the
charge, it failed to serve as a deterrent.  For this reason,
illegal vendors are now arrested by members of ordinance
enforcement teams, whose primary role is to ensure that vendors
comply with city ordinances.  This approach has reduced the
number of vendors on the platforms, allowing passengers to move
freely and safely in the subway areas.

Assigning Personnel

     Watch commanders use three methods to assign personnel,
including Operation Impact, Operation Vacuum, and Operation
Saturation.  Commanders who use Operation Impact assign their
officers based on ridership traffic patterns.  Officers are
assigned to stations that handle large numbers of riders, while
those stations with fewer riders are monitored by moving police

     Criminals tend to explore transit systems for areas where
there is no police presence.  Operation Vacuum enables watch
commanders to withdraw uniformed officers from a specific
station and deploy them to another area.  The ostensibly vacant
station can then become the focal point of a tactical team.

     When officials want to convey the impression that police
are everywhere, such as during rush-hour at busy stations, they
use Operation Saturation.  This operation, which may last either
all or part of a shift, involves saturating particular lines
with uniformed officers.  It is an effective way to both deter
criminals and build citizen confidence in the CTA's policing
methods by conveying the impression that officers are


     Mass transit systems are an integral part of large cities,
and as these cities expand in both population and size, the
importance of this mode of transportation will also increase.
However, if citizens refuse to use subways because they believe
that they are unsafe, the full potential of the systems will
never be realized.  For this reason, officials must begin to
look at ways to reduce crime on rapid transit systems, which
will also help to change citizen perception.

     The initiatives put into operation by the Chicago Mass
Transit System are examples of how a concerted effort to reduce
crime can work.  During the first year of the program, there was
a 40-percent reduction in reported serious crime, and the crime
rate continues to decline.  The plan has been a resounding
success, with ridership on the rise again. The Chicago subway is
finally becoming a safe--and popular--mode of transportation.


     (1)  "Policing Urban Mass Transit Systems," U.S. Department
of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977.

[Law] Shutdown Over Computer Crime

Article reprinted from STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 5, 1990

Author: Brooks Boliek

Showdown over computer 'crime'

Some of the nation's computer pioneers see the digital world in
which they toil as a cybernetic rangeland with its own kind of
frontier justice.  And some of them have set out to change the

Their rallying cry is Operation Sun Devil and other government
probes into malfeasance by so-called computer "hackers."  These
investigations, they assert, smack of hang-em-high justice and
all to often become examples of government heavy-handedness.

"Some of the government's actions clearly weren't
constitutional," said Mitch Kapor, founder of Lotus Development
Corp. and a new software firm ON Technology in Cambridge, Mass.

Kapor, along with a small group of fellow computer pioneers,
recently announced the formation of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, a group dedicated to protecting the rights of
computer users.  Its ultimate goal is to extend the same First
Amendment protection that the print and broadcast media enjoy to
digital communications.

"Our idea is to get people to understand the issues and not to
try and make decisions in a controversial and confrontational
atmosphere," Kapor said.

Secret Service and U.S. Justice Department spokesmen in
Washington declined to comment on Operation Sun Devil or other
computer investigations.  But they stressed that the federal
agencies are mindful of the need to protect civil rights.

"We are not just some renegade agency breaking into peoples's
computer systems,"said Secret Service Agent Rich Adams.  "We
would not be investigating if we were not mandated by Congress. 
That's why we're involved."

The foundation is pushing its goals by providing legal assistance
to computer users who become victims of what they see as overly
zealous law enforcement officials.  It also is awarding grants to
civil liberties organizations such as the Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility in Palo Alto.

Kapor stresses that the foundation is not a defense fund for
"hackers" and does not support breaking into computer systems or
pirating software.

The foundation has already had an impact.  It recently located
defense witnesses in the government's case against computer
bulletin board operator and newsletter publisher Craig Neidorf. 
On July 27, in the middle of the trial, the government abruptly
dropped its case against Neidorf.

Neidorf was accused of interstate transportation of a stolen
BellSouth Corp. document describing its emergency 911 system, a
charge which stems from the government's investigation into a
group of hackers called the Legion of Doom.

Prosecutors dropped Neidorf's case when Sheldon Zenner, Neidorf's
attorney, showed that the information which BellSouth alleged was
proprietary could be purchased by calling an 800 number and
paying $13.

'Private police force'
Terry Gross, an attorney that aided Neidorf's defense team,
accused the government of serving as a private police force for
large corporations.

"I think it is a very serious concern that we should all have of
the government being used as a private police force for private
corporations," Gross said.  "Especially when BellSouth made a
claim that the government accepted."

The foundation contends that prosecutors, policemen and judges
must think of computer communications in the same way they think
of printed and broadcast communications.

In the eyes of foundation leaders, their main opponent is the
federal government.  Operation Sun Devil, a two-year
investigation, has so far resulted in seven arrests and some 40
computers and 23,000 disks of data.

Kapor's group draws a parallel between the Pentagon Papers case,
which involved classified government papers documenting the
history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and Neidorf's.  If
Neidorf had published the document in a newspaper, as The New
York Times and The Washington Post published the Pentagon Papers,
he would have been protected.

"The example they use is a good one," said Ken Wasch, executive
director of the Software Publishers Association.  If someone
printed a document on how to get into a federal facility there
would be no restrictions on publication, he explained.  "But if
you put it on a (computer) bulletin board there would be."

Complex issues
Kapor said the Secret Service, the lead investigating agency for
computer crimes, as well as the FBI and prosecutors often fail to
understand the complex issues that arise with computer crimes. 
He said law enforcement officers are like most people when it
comes to computers: uninformed.

Kapor believes that people are afraid of computers because they
don't understand them.  To minimize the misunderstanding, the
foundation wants to educate law enforcement officers, judicial
officers and the public about digital communications.  

"There is a hugh gap between where most of us regular folk are
today and where the technology is," Kapor said.

Feds claim expertise
Secret Service agent Adams disputed the notion that federal
officials lack computer expertise.  The service has been
investigating  computer crimes since 1984, he said.

"I think it's just the opposite is true," Adams said.  "We are
very effective in our investigations and if we didn't have the
expertise we wouldn't be as effective."

Adams acknowledged that a lack of manpower means his agency must
pick and choose what to investigate.

"They (the EFF) would lead you to believe that we are out there
cracking everyone's computer system and looking into every
bulletin board," he said.  "We simply do not have the manpower to
do that.  We pinpoint the large dollar losses and those are the
ones we investigate."

At least one member of Congress has expressed some concern over
the government's crackdown on computer crime.  Sen. Patrick
Leahy, D-Vt., wants to change the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986 to prevent the government from going too far.  Neidorf was
indicted under the law.

"As far as I can tell all he did was republish a document in
Phrack (his newsletter)," Leahy said during a hearing on the
issue.  "That's not a heck of a lot different than someone
walking down the street who picks up a document and writes a
letter to the editor."

The Neidorf case has disturbed Leahy, who said he is face with
the nettlesome problem of balancing the need for computer
security with individual rights.

"We know people work very hard to create products with their
computers," he said.  "They ought to be able to protect those. 
At the same time, I don't want to see the mass resources of the
United States Justice Department turned loose on things that
don't make that much difference."


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[Law] Respectible Pusher

October 1991                                                     

                     THE RESPECTABLE PUSHER                          


                        Jeffrey D. Lane                                 
           Agent serving as Director of Investigations
                Georgia Examining Boards Division
                Office of the Secretary of State
                        Atlanta, Georgia

     In November 1989, children playing in a wooded area behind
their apartment complex discovered a partially decomposed body.
Although an autopsy revealed that the person died of
hypothermia, a contributing factor to the death was an overdose
of drugs.

     After a search warrant was issued, investigators found
numerous empty bottles of prescription drugs from surrounding
pharmacies in the victim's apartment.  These labels revealed
that the deceased had received drugs from the same doctor on a
regular basis over an extended period of time, which most likely
resulted in addiction.

     Did the doctor prescribing the drugs contribute to this
persons death?  Were any criminal statutes violated in this
case?  Was this doctor a "pusher" or a "healer"?

     This article discusses how Federal statutes apply to
medical practitioners when they prescribe controlled substances.
It also offers an overview of how law enforcement personnel
should conduct investigations concerning unscrupulous medical
practitioners who illegally dispense prescription drugs.


     Medical practitioners are licensed by the States in which
they practice, and in order to prescribe controlled substances
lawfully, they must also be registered with the Drug Enforcement
Administration.  According to Federal statutes, practitioners
must issue prescriptions in the usual course of a professional
practice, and these prescriptions must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose. (1)

     When patients come to them with medical problems,
physicians must determine whether controlled substances are
necessary to treat the problem.  However, to show that
prescribing the drugs was in the course of professional
practice, it is essential that physicians establish a
doctor/patient relationship. (2)  In order to establish this
type of relationship, three criteria must be met:

     *  The patient must desire treatment for a legitimate
        illness or condition,

     *  The physician must make a reasonable effort to determine
        what the patient's legitimate medical needs are through
        physical examinations and questioning the  patient about
        medical problems,

     *  There must be reasonable correlations between the 
        drugs prescribed and the patients legitimate medical
        needs.  (3)


     When abuse is suspected, there are two basic methods of
investigation--undercover operations and documentary
investigations (commonly referred to as "paper cases").  Both
methods work, but investigators should not opt for one method
over another without considering the circumstances surrounding
the case.  Therefore, it is necessary to conduct preliminary
investigations before deciding which method to use.

Preliminary Investigation

     During the preliminary investigation of suspected
offenders, officers should determine what specific drugs the
doctor is prescribing, the patient traffic patterns in and out
of the medical office, whether the doctor conducts physical
examinations, the frequency and quantity of drugs prescribed,
and whether the doctor accepts new patients.  This information,
which is invaluable when investigators try to develop a
believable undercover scenario or decide what areas to target
for pharmacy surveys, can come from several sources, including
other practitioners, pharmacists, family members of patients,
informants/defendants, wholesalers/distributors, other law
enforcement/regulatory agencies, surveillance of suspect, and
reference materials and texts.

     Interviews with persons listed above can provide details
concerning what specific drugs were prescribed and ordered,
current investigations, practitioner history, required
examinations, and the cost of a prescription for undercover
purposes.  Surveillance helps to determine patient traffic
patterns, number of out-of-State patients, parking lot
transactions, and the type of patient clientele.  Reference
materials help to identify drugs and determine their legitimate
uses and abuse potential.

     The information developed during the preliminary
investigation helps investigators to determine if further
investigation is warranted, to plan successful undercover
operations, and to decide what undercover scenarios might be
most effective.  Any undercover operation should precede the
documentary investigation, because interviews and subpoenas may
alert the doctor to the fact that there is an ongoing

Undercover Operation                                              

     Before undertaking an undercover operation, it is important
to consult with the local prosecutor to clarify any legal
questions concerning the operation.  Once this has been done,
and all the legal issues have been addressed, planning for the
undercover office visit can continue.  The undercover scenario
must be plausible or the operative will be told to leave the
office.  Also important to a successful undercover operation is
that the operative not give a legitimate medical need for the
drugs that are prescribed.

     The purpose of the initial undercover operation is
threefold:  To obtain evidence, to gather information for future
undercover visits, and to determine whether to continue the
investigation.  During the initial undercover visit,
investigators should determine whether examinations are given,
the kind of questions asked by the doctor, and whether the
physician tries to establish a doctor/patient relationship.  A
minimum of two people is necessary to conduct this visit to the
physician's office.  (One to act as a patient; the other to
monitor any recording equipment and to serve as backup.)

     Recording undercover visits provides the best evidence,
because taped conversations reveal that the doctor knows that
the drugs being prescribed are not for legitimate purposes.
Also, if the physician requires the "patient" to state a
legitimate reason for needing drugs, the investigator can direct
the conversation to show that the physician is merely trying to
appear legitimate.  For example, if the doctor requests that the
undercover officer write a legitimate reason for the drugs on a
patient information form, the officer should respond by asking
what, exactly, should be written.

     Also, some physicians, after writing a prescription,
instruct patients to go to a particular pharmacy to have it
filled or to fill it in another area of town to avoid
suspicions.  These types of interchange are an indication of the
lack of a legitimate doctor/patient relationship, and having
these conversations recorded strengthens the case against the

     Once a physician issues an illegal prescription to one
operative, other undercover investigators should make
appointments with the same physician.  However, too many new
"patients" may arouse suspicion.  Doctors who operate illegally
will be wary of undercover operatives and may attempt to weed
them out by questions and examinations.  Several operatives who
make a minimum of two to three successful visits each will show
an abusive practice, establish multiple counts, and corroborate
that the physician is dispensing drugs indiscriminately.

     If no drugs are prescribed illegally during the initial
undercover visit, a second operative should visit the physician.
This operative should be different in gender from the first, and
a different scenario might also be used.  If the physician fails
to prescribe drugs illegally during this visit, officers should
end the undercover operation and begin a documentary

     The length of the undercover operation, as well as how soon
the undercover operative can repeat a visit, depends on the type
of drugs the operative receives.  The information gathered
during the preliminary investigation will help investigators
make a decision on how frequent the visits should be.  For
example, if the doctor is running a "diet" practice and
prescribes amphetamines, the operative may only be able to go in
once every 30 days, the usual time period diet pills are
prescribed.  Other doctors may give another 30-day supply after
only 2 weeks.

     If, on the other hand, the physician prescribes pain pills,
the undercover operative may be able to go in more often.  This
type of medication is prescribed more frequently than diet pills
or sleeping pills.

Documentary Investigation

     Officers should pursue a documentary investigation when the
preliminary investigation reveals that there is little chance of
a successful undercover operation, the physician accepts no new
patients, or if the undercover operation fails to produce
evidence of the physician's guilt.  However, even when the
undercover operation does produce evidence, it is still
important to document the investigation with interviews, patient
records, prescriptions, prescription data, and expert witness

     A documentary investigation is a five-step process, with
each step building upon the preceding step.  For this reason,
investigators should complete the steps in proper sequence.
They should:

     1)  Survey pharmacies within certain geographical
         boundaries to obtain prescription data,

     2)  Organize the prescription data,                           

     3)  Obtain and review patient records,                        

     4)  Interview patients, and                                   

     5)  Obtain expert witness reports/testimony.                  

     Survey area pharmacies                                       

     In order to obtain data and information about a physicians
prescribing patterns, investigators should survey all pharmacies
that are located within an established geographical target area.
Investigators should also review all prescriptions issued by the
physician during a particular time span, such as 1 or 2 years.
Knowing the length of time the doctor has kept certain patients
on addictive medications helps to establish a pattern of abuse.

     Pharmacists can be either of great value or a hindrance to
the investigation.  Their information contains details and
knowledge to which only they are privy.  However, because
pharmacy income is directly tied to the prescriptions from the
doctors in the area, some pharmacists will inform them of
current investigations.  Because the interview of only one
pharmacist has caused some doctors to close their practices
immediately, investigators should weigh this factor heavily when
conducting the investigation.

     Some pharmacists will not allow investigators to review the
prescriptions, making it necessary to obtain subpoenas or search
warrants.  Other pharmacists will provide investigators with
computer printouts of the requested information.  If there is a
problem with a particular pharmacist, the State Medical Board or
Pharmacy Board may be able to assist investigators.

     Investigators should record the information found on the
prescription forms in an organized format for future reference.
Of particular interest are the date the prescription was issued
to the patient, the drug name, drug dosage, total amount
prescribed, and the prescription number.

     Perhaps the most important piece of information found on
the prescription form, aside from the drug and quantity, is the
prescription number.  This is usually a four-to eight-digit
number found either on the container label of the drug or on the
prescription form.  Each prescription has a separate number that
investigators can use to prepare search warrants or identify
particular prescriptions in court.  This number also assists
investigators in finding a specific prescription among

     Organize the prescription data

     After investigators contact all the pharmacies in the
target area for prescription information, the data should be
organized to help investigators concentrate on the blatant
cases.  The prescriptions should be put in alphabetical order by
the patient's last name, and then each patient's prescriptions
should be placed in chronological order.  By doing this,
investigators immediately know what drugs each patient received,
the quantity, and how frequently the drug was prescribed.
Organizing the data also reveals dangerous drug combinations and
helps investigators to determine which patients should be
interviewed later.

     Since many "patients" go to numerous pharmacies to avoid
detection, a computerized data base is helpful for recording and
organizing all the data collected.  Once the information is
entered into the data base, it can be sorted in a variety of
ways that will reveal patterns or other clues to investigators.
For example, a profile will show which pharmacy filled the
majority of the prescriptions.  This information is important if
investigators suspect a conspiracy between the doctor and

     In some cases, the prescription data, coupled with expert
witness testimony, can establish probable cause for a search
warrant to obtain patient records from the physician's office.
If this is not the case, investigators should interview the
doctor's patients to determine whether a doctor/patient
relationship existed.  These interviews, along with the other
information obtained up to this point in the investigation,
should be sufficient to obtain a search warrant.

     Obtain and review patient records

     Investigators should thoroughly review all of the patient
records to pinpoint inconsistencies and document the fact that
the physician prescribed drugs illegally.  For example, a
patient may have been receiving an amphetamine, supposedly to
lose weight.  If, however, this patient had a history of
hypertension, with dangerously high blood pressure recorded on
the day of the doctor's visit, an amphetamine prescription would
be inappropriate because amphetamines tend to further elevate
the blood pressure.  In addition, the patient's recorded height
and weight may show there was not a legitimate need for a diet

     Patient records that do not document patient histories,
physical exams, laboratory tests, consultations, or referrals
are also an indication that a legitimate doctor/patient
relationship did not exist.  On the other hand, some physicians
keep thorough patient records in order to appear legitimate.
Patient interviews and expert witness reviews help refute this
false documentation.

     Interview patients

     Investigators should interview patients to determine as
much as possible about whether the doctor establishes a
doctor/patient relationship before prescribing drugs.  For
example, one physician assigned six patients per examining room
for cursory examinations, and investigators were later able to
interview these patients to corroborate the lack of a legitimate
doctor/patient relationship.  When witnesses learn that they are
not the focus of the investigation, they will oftentimes
cooperate with investigators.  Investigators can then subpoena
these witnesses to testify at trial.

     Obtain expert witness reports/testimony

     Expert witnesses may include physicians, dentists, medical
school professors, pharmacology professors, or other
professionals who can testify to the proper legal procedures
needed to practice medicine.  These witnesses may give expert
opinions concerning drug tolerance and addiction.  They may
testify about the appropriateness of the time period the drugs
were prescribed and what the law requires with regard to the
usual course of professional practice.

     It is important for investigators to inform expert
witnesses that their review may require them to testify in
court.  If they are not aware of this from the beginning, they
may be hostile or uncooperative on the witness stand.  It is
also important that investigators give expert witnesses copies
of the original records so that important evidence is not
altered in anyway.

     When this last step of the investigation is complete,
investigators should discuss the case with their local
prosecutors.  They can troubleshoot any problems before the
grand jury hears the case and arrest warrants are issued.


     Prescription drug abuse is a serious problem that is
sometimes overlooked.  This may be a result of a lack of
interest or a lack of knowledge on the part of investigators,
who are unsure about how to pursue such an investigation.

     However, law enforcement officers must dedicate themselves
to the problem of drug abuse, not only where hard drugs are
concerned but also by keeping legitimate drugs out of the hands
of the "respectable pushers."  By doing this, they will bring to
the forefront a problem that has, in the past, been largely


     (1)  21 USC 802, 21 CFR 1306.02 (b).

     (2)  U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Bulletin issued
by the Associate Chief Counsel, 1987.

     (3)  Supra, note 1.

[Law] Police Practices Telimarketing Crime Prevention

October 1991                                                      

                       POLICE PRACTICES                                  
                TELEMARKETING CRIME PREVENTION                        


                     David I. Rechenmacher                                 
          Downers Grove, Illinois, Police Department

     In dealing with residential burglaries, traditional law 
enforcement practices tend to be strictly reactive and do little
to deter future crime.  Additionally, due to fiscal constraints
in many jurisdictions, this problem is compounded by the limited
number of police officers available to patrol neighborhoods.
And, while neighborhood watch programs are important, they can
be difficult to maintain due to the high mobility of our

     The problems of residential burglaries confront every law
enforcement agency in the country.  And, the Downers Grove,
Illinois, Police Department, with a sworn and civilian staff of
92, is no different.  However, even with a crime prevention
program in place, local residents did not request any crime
prevention assistance.


     The police department determined that the best service it
could provide to deter residential burglary was to offer a home
security survey.  The home security survey, performed by members
of the department's Crime Prevention Unit, is a proactive
program aimed at reducing the number of residential burglaries.

     In the past, however, the Crime Prevention Unit performed
home security surveys when requested by citizens.
Unfortunately, this method resulted in only 30-40 home surveys
being conducted annually, despite an area population of 46,000.
It was clear that in order for the program to be more effective,
it needed to reach more residents.


     As a result, in October 1988, the unit began having
messages printed on all water bills forwarded to Downers Grove
residents.  These messages encouraged residents to call the
police department to make appointments for free home security
surveys.  This initiative was met with a very positive response
from the community and resulted in 258 home security surveys
being conducted during 1989.


     Encouraged by the success of this initiative, the unit
thought that a more-aggressive marketing campaign would deliver
even better results.  Therefore, in early 1990, the unit began a
telemarketing program using the city telephone directory as a
source for contacts.

     Under this program, the Crime Prevention Unit's community
support assistant telephones residents to explain the free home
security survey and to make appointments to conduct the survey
at a time and date convenient to the resident.  During the
survey, which takes approximately 1 hour, a crime prevention
practitioner evaluates home security risks, such as exterior
lighting and landscaping, doors, windows, and locks, and gives
advice to homeowners that would make their property and
possessions less vulnerable to burglars.


     The telemarketing of home security surveys in Downers
Grove, Illinois, has not only proved successful but it has also
paid big community relations dividends for the police department
and the Village of Downers Grove.  In 1990, the Crime Prevention
Unit completed 380 surveys and expects to perform over 400
during 1991.


     Unfortunately, the importance of adequate crime prevention
is oftentimes difficult to instill in the general public until
it is too late.  However, if law enforcement agencies want
successful crime prevention programs, they need to reach out to
the citizens before the unfortunate occurrence takes place.
Programs of this type are especially appropriate for departments
with small crime prevention components, because instead of
expensive equipment or capital outlay, they require only time
and dedication.

[Law] Police Practices Ministers With Police to Keep the Peace

September 1991                                                    

                       POLICE PRACTICES:                               
          MINISTERS TEAM WITH POLICE TO KEEP THE PEACE                     


                         D. R. Staton 
                Police and Ministers Associaton
                   Virginia Beach, Virginia
                         Larry Edwards                                  
           Daytona Beach Police-Ministers Association

     In 1989, an annual Labor Day weekend gathering of college
students in the resort city of Virginia Beach, Virginia, erupted
into violent rioting.  Thousands of students who had gathered to
celebrate "Greekfest," so-called because of its origins as a
fraternity gathering, took to the streets, looting shorefront
shops and creating social unrest.  The event captured media
attention.  Nationwide, Americans witnessed the rioting and law
enforcement response that mirrored police actions of the 1960s.

     Once the student uprising was quelled, the city council and
police department looked for ways to avert similar situations.
Virginia Beach had built a reputation as a family vacation spot.
But the events of the 1989 Labor Day weekend, combined with
rising youth gang activity, threatened to mar the peaceful
atmosphere of the resort.

     In searching for new approaches to deal with the large
number of students (and other young visitors) who stream into
the city for the Labor Day weekend, Virginia Beach Police
officials focused on a similar event that occurred annually in
Daytona Beach, Florida.  Each year, college students and other
young adults converge on the resort area during Spring Break.
While slightly higher arrest rates and the expected parking
infractions occur during this time, there are no largescale
disturbances as the one that took place in Virginia Beach.


     When Virginia Beach police officials visited the Daytona
area, they found that an integral part of the police
department's strategy to quell potential unrest is an expanded
police chaplain program.  Since its establishment in 1986, the
Daytona Beach Police-Ministers Association has served as both a
buffer and liaison between the police and the community.  The
association is made up of area chaplains, both black and white,
representing many faiths.  The ministers ride with officers
throughout the year, but increase their presence during special
events, such as Spring Break and college homecomings.

     The ministers are trained and sensitized to the rigors of
law enforcement.  The majority of their instruction comes from
the programs coordinator, who is a former police officer.

     In addition, the ministers are trained to spot crowd
"leaders."  As they mingle with groups of young people in the
resort area, they explain what the police are doing and why.
Though this is not an easy task, their success rate has been
very high.  As a result, the ministers are credited with
quelling many would-be, and potentially explosive, disturbances.
They, in particular, create a calming effect upon young,
would-be troublemakers who, at the slightest provocation, could
confront the police.

     The coordinator of the Daytona association persuaded the
Virginia Beach Police Department, and then a somewhat reluctant
community, to consider the same approach in that city.  The
result was the creation of the Virginia Beach Police and
Ministers Association.


     At the direction of the police chief, 40 members of the
clergy from Virginia Beach area churches of all denominations
were asked to become certified police chaplains.  Over 30
volunteer chaplains, including military chaplains from the
nearby naval base in Norfolk, attended a weeklong workshop and
orientation in June 1990.  The coordinator of the Daytona Beach
program made several visits to Virginia Beach to help set up the
program and to supervise the training.  The instruction

     *  Crowd control techniques,                                    

     *  General communication skills,                                

     *  Basic self-defense,                                          

     *  Police radio operation,                                      

     *  Patrol car conduct/activity,                                 

     *  Police patrol regulations and procedures,                    

     *  General counseling (of both officers and citizens),          

     *  Instruction concerning when to assist officers,              

     *  Coping with failure,                                         

     *  Human relations skills, and                                  

     *  Relating to military personnel.                              

In addition, the ministers were shown films, complete with
critical assessments, of the 1989 riot in Virginia Beach and
Daytonas 1990 Spring Break.

     On the last day of training, the volunteer chaplains were
assigned to accompany officers on foot patrol.  One chaplain was
assigned to each of the 16 two-officer foot patrol teams
covering the resorts main strip roadway.  In addition, a
chaplain accompanied each of the 12 two-officer units patrolling
the boardwalk area (approximately 50 blocks.)


     During the first weeks of the program, chaplains proved
very effective in calming potentially explosive situations.
Often, they succeeded in averting confrontations before police
involvement was required.  Gradually, reluctant officers began
to request the assistance of the chaplains in various

     The volunteer chaplains worked every Friday and Saturday
night from June 29th to the Labor Day weekend (also including
the July 4th holiday).  When the summer tourist season came to
an end, the volunteer chaplains had completed 1,626 hours of
walking beats with police officers.

LABORFEST 1990                                   

     The "big test" for the chaplain program, however, was the
Labor Day weekend and the task of helping to "keep the lid" on
the potentially explosive annual gathering of students and young
adults, now called Laborfest.  The holiday weekend was the
program's most active, with 35 chaplains contributing 740 hours
of service.  The result of the chaplains' efforts and the other
measures adopted by the city proved very successful.  During
Labor Day weekend 1989, there were approximately 1,500 arrests
and significant property damage to the city.  During the same
weekend in 1990, there were 100 arrests and only minimal
property damage.

     There were several reasons for this success.  A
comprehensive strategy had been developed to alleviate some of
the factors that contributed to the unrest of the previous year.
Checkpoints were erected at the entrances to the resort strip to
restrict traffic flow, and only residents and visitors with
confirmed accommodations were allowed to proceed past the
checkpoints.  Other motorists were required to park their
vehicles at satellite sites where a shuttle service was
operating to take them to and from the waterfront.  In addition,
concerts, dances, and other events were organized by the city,
as part of Laborfest.

     The chaplain program, too, was an integral part of the
police department's strategy to reduce the possibility of
unrest.  Officers maintained a low profile and allowed the
chaplains to approach problem situations in pairs or groups.
When crowds began to get overzealous or rowdy, chaplains
provided a calming influence that kept the atmosphere peaceful.

     After the Labor Day weekend, 23 chaplains chose to remain
active in the program.  They were provided additional training
and are now assigned to accompany patrol units in all areas of
the city.  The remaining chaplains are available for special
events and for resumption of the summer program.


     When violence and criminal activity threatened the peaceful
atmosphere in Virginia Beach, police officials decided to
approach the problem with innovative strategies.  Basing an
expanded police chaplain program on the successful Daytona Beach
experience, they were able to provide an effective response to
the problem at a minimal cost to the city.

     Volunteer chaplains have proved to be a very valuable
police resource.  They provide a calming influence and help to
reduce anxiety during potentially violent situations.  In the
process, they have helped to foster a sense of good will between
the police, the community, and visitors to the resort area.

[Law] Foreign Counter-Intelligence an FBI Priority

September 1991                                                    
                         AN FBI PRIORITY                    

                       James E. Tomlinson
                     Special Agent in Charge 
              Foreign Counterintelligence Division
                        FBI Field Office
                     New York City, New York

     To law enforcement agencies and the American public, the
FBI is recognized traditionally for its criminal investigations
of bank robberies, kidnapings, and fugitives.  Within the last
decade, they also came to learn about the Bureau's active
participation in organized crime, white-collar crime, violent
crime, and drug investigations.  However, few Americans realize
that a major investigative responsibility of the FBI is foreign
counterintelligence (FCI).

     This article provides a brief overview of the FBI's foreign
counterintelligence mission.  It then addresses how local and
State law enforcement can assist the FBI in its FCI efforts.


     The foreign counterintelligence mission of the FBI is to
collect, analyze, and use information to identify and neutralize
the activities of foreign powers and their agents that adversely
affect national security.  The Bureau also conducts and/or
supervises espionage investigations in U.S. diplomatic
establishments abroad and investigates worldwide espionage
activity directed against the United States that involves
non-military U.S. citizens.

     Historically, the FBI has carried on major intelligence and
counterintelligence operations since World War II, when it
actively sought out Axis saboteurs operating in this country.
Even after the war, the FBI played a role in civilian
intelligence collection.  However, when the National Security
Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency, which
was given the responsibility for collecting positive
intelligence, (1) the FBI's focus was directed to

     Since FCI investigations are usually classified, little
information on the FBI's efforts is ever disseminated to the
public.  Only in major espionage cases, such as those involving
William Holden Bell, the John Walker family, and Ronald Pelton,
did the public even get a glimpse into the Bureau's
counterintelligence world.  Yet, espionage activity still exists
in this country.  Between 1976 and 1990, there were 67
successful prosecutions for espionage in the United States.

     The damage caused by these cases from a financial
perspective alone is incalculable.  For example, William Holden
Bell, a senior radar engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company in Los
Angeles, California, received $110,000 for information passed to
Marian Zacharski, a Polish businessman and covert agent for the
Polish Intelligence Service.  The information Bell provided on
the F-15 Look Down-Shoot Down Radar, TOW anti-tank missile,
Phoenix air-to-air missile, and quiet radar saved the Soviets
(2) approximately $185 million in technological research and
advanced their technology by about 5 years by permitting them to
implement proven design concepts. (3)  But, the dangers placed
on each and every U.S. citizen from a national security
standpoint cannot be measured in dollar figures alone.

     Arrests and prosecutions for espionage, however, make up
only a minute portion of the FCI work that the FBI does.  Of
greater importance is the ability to identify those involved in
espionage activities and to stop them before they pass
classified or sensitive information.  Early detection of
individuals who might be inclined to sell sensitive information
or who are targeted for coercive recruitment by foreign
intelligence agents to provide such information is the primary
goal of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence program.

     Prosecution will always be an option for deterrence
purposes, but complete success will only be achieved if
detection is accomplished before national security is damaged.
For example, in the case of the John Walker spy ring, the U.S.
Navy suffered an unprecedented loss of classified data that
provided the Soviet Union with information on Naval operations
and capabilities.  It is estimated that damage to national
security was in excess of $1 billion in research and development
alone.  However, as an expert witness and outside observer noted
during the trial, "..the information provided by Walker was
priceless and its acquisition would be beyond the wildest dreams
and hopes in the office of the KGB." (4)


     A sizable portion of the Bureau's work force is dedicated
to its FCI mission.  In fact, every FBI field office has
designated personnel whose primary investigative responsibility
is foreign counterintelligence.  An FCI staff may range in size
from one Special Agent in a small Midwest office to several
hundred in the New York City Office, where foreign
counterintelligence is considered the number one investigative

     Yet, even though the FBI dedicates a sizable portion of its
resources, both personnel and monetary, to counterintelligence,
it is still greatly outnumbered by known or suspected foreign
intelligence officers.  There are nearly 3,000 foreign
diplomatic officials in New York City alone who are affiliated
with the United Nations or with consular posts and who are from
countries with interests traditionally viewed as hostile to the
United States.

     The FBI has determined that a number of these officials are
intelligence officers or have some relationship with foreign
intelligence services.  While in this country, these
intelligence officers enjoy the freedoms of the United States.
They have generally unrestricted access to public source
information, as well as contact with U.S. industrial and
academic personnel from whom they can obtain technology and
other intelligence-related information.  In addition, experience
has shown that a threat to U.S. security also exists from
nontraditional adversaries.  For example, Jonathan Pollard, an
intelligence analyst at the Naval Investigative Service, was
arrested for spying for Israel, for which he received a life
prison sentence.

     Despite the resources devoted to FCI investigations, the
FBI alone cannot monitor all foreign intelligence service
officers adequately.  The Bureau recognizes that it needs help
to protect the security of this country.  And to this end, it
enlists the help of the U.S. law enforcement community in its
FCI mission.


     In cities where most foreign intelligence officers are
assigned, such as New York City and Washington, D.C., the FBI
has a concentration of FCI resources.  However, when foreign
intelligence officers travel outside these areas, they are often
afforded less scrutiny.  Furthermore, individuals not yet
identified as intelligence officers, such as diplomats,
students, or tourists, may also carry out intelligence
functions.  This is where local and State law enforcement can
assist the FBI.

     All law enforcement personnel should be aware of vehicles
registered to foreign embassies, consulates, and U.N. missions,
and their personnel, traveling in their jurisdictions.  These
vehicles can be identified by their distinctive license plates.
Through the Office of Foreign Missions Act, the U.S. State
Department issues special license plates for vehicles of foreign
missions and their staffs accredited in the United States.
These license plates are red, white, and blue and have a letter
code that denotes the status of the registered owner.  The
letter "D" signifies diplomat, "C" means a member of a
consulate, and "S" denotes a staff member.  A separate
two-letter abbreviation on the license plate identifies the
country of origin of the registrant.  For example, the letter
designation for the U.S.S.R. is "FC."  Therefore, a diplomatic
license plate that reads "FCD," along with three numbers, means
that the vehicle is registered to a Soviet diplomat assigned to
the Soviet mission in New York City.  A "DFC" designation
identifies a Soviet bilateral diplomat assigned to Washington,
D.C.  Local FBI offices have wallet-size cards available that
list the various diplomatic designations.

     When these individuals travel outside their diplomatic
area, their activities may be of interest to the FBI.  This is
especially the case if such a license plate is observed in a
rural area, near a U.S. military installation, in the vicinity
of a defense contractor, or for that matter, anywhere at an
unusual time.  Noting the license plate number and reporting it
immediately to the local FBI office may be of great importance.

     Of course, individuals operating these vehicles may be
legitimate diplomats fulfilling their official responsibilities
or just traveling on personal business.  And since only a small
percentage of diplomats are active in clandestine intelligence
operations, no action should be taken against these individuals.
Providing information on the license plate, the number of
occupants, and the location of the vehicle when observed to the
local FBI office is all that is necessary.

     It should be noted, however, that not all individuals
operating vehicles with these official State Department plates
automatically enjoy full diplomatic immunity.  Such immunity is
granted only to those who are accredited by the U.S. Department
of State and only to the extent appropriate to their status.
Distinctive license plates themselves confer no immunity; they
simply alert law enforcement officials that the vehicle's
operator is likely to be a person enjoying some degree of
immunity. (5)

     Law enforcement officers who have any questions regarding
the diplomatic status of any individual need only contact the
local FBI office or the U.S. Department of State.  FBI personnel
can quickly confirm through FBI Headquarters and the State
Department the individual's official standing and accompanying


     Even with the many changes occurring in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, the FBI must maintain a "business as usual"
attitude with regard to counterintelligence operations.  As long
as the United States continues to be a leader in technological
research and design, countries that are less developed will
continue to seek a "quick fix" to solve their economic problems.
Therefore, despite an era of Glasnost or "openness," Americans
cannot afford to disregard the unusual activities of diplomats
and foreign visitors who pose a threat to national security.

     In addition, because of this new "openness," the high rate
of crime and drug problems experienced by Eastern European
countries and the Soviet Union is coming to light.  In their
efforts to address these crime problems, these countries
routinely request assistance from U.S. law enforcement.  Soviet
journalists have requested information regarding laboratory
techniques and drug prevention from both the FBI and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.  More and more, local, State, and
other Federal law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, are
also being approached to provide crime-fighting assistance to
their Eastern European and Soviet counterparts.  And, there is
every reason to believe that these requests for scientific
training and technological information from U.S. agencies will


     Countries seeking assistance from U.S. law enforcement can
benefit from the vast knowledge that has been developed over the
years.  And, because of the unselfish willingness of local,
State, and Federal agencies to provide such assistance, the
world should see significant improvements in the law enforcement
systems operating in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  This,
in turn, will hopefully result in a more positive image for law
enforcement worldwide.

     As is often the case, but particularly within the law
enforcement community, strong bonds develop between professional
personnel.  However, U.S. law enforcement officers must remain
alert to the distinct possibility of exploitation by Eastern
European countries and the Soviet Union.  Many foreign law
enforcement agencies have strong ties to their intelligence
services.  And, these intelligence services, in turn, are very
interested in access to U.S. law enforcement computer systems,
equipment, training methods, and operational techniques for
intelligence purposes.

     Accordingly, the FBI has expanded its FCI awareness
education program for defense contractors to include U.S. law
enforcement agencies that are involved in exchange programs with
other countries.  Law enforcement agencies are strongly urged to
contact their local FBI offices if they plan to participate in
an exchange program with a foreign police service.  Trained
personnel will provide appropriate specialized briefings that
can help to ensure foreign intelligence services do not gain
information that may be harmful to the interests of national


     The FBI's foreign counterintelligence mission is not as
publicized as its other law enforcement functions.  However,
individuals committing espionage or aiding agents of foreign
intelligence services are often greater threats to the American
public than major criminal offenders.  The collective damages
caused by the John Walker spy ring, Ronald Pelton, William Bell,
and others, the espionage cases that have occurred since 1985,
are beyond financial comprehension.

     The FBI alone cannot hope to identify all intelligence
activity conducted in the United States and actively monitor all
intelligence officers operating in this country.  The
cooperation and assistance of the U.S. law enforcement community
is essential.  By working together, local, State, and Federal
law enforcement personnel can curtail the inimical activities of
foreign intelligence agents in the United States, and thereby,
safeguard the security of this Nation.


     (1)  Positive intelligence refers to information gathered
from both domestic and foreign sources that may be of use to
U.S. Government agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities.

     (2)  At the time, the Polish Intelligence Service was a
surrogate of the KGB, and information acquired by its agents was
funneled directly to Moscow.

     (3)  "Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western
Technology:  An Update," (unclassified), Central Intelligence
Agency, September 1985, p. 20.

     (4)  Whitworth Trial Transcripts, Federal District Court,
San Francisco, California, 1986.

     (5)  The Office of Foreign Missions has prepared a booklet
entitled "Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers:  Personal
Rights and Immunities of Foreign Diplomats and Consular
Personnel," U.S. Department of State publication No. 9533,
revised February 1988, which provides guidance on this and other
related issues.

[Law] Developing Police Leadership

October 1991                                                      


                       Paul Hansen                                
               Irondequoit Police Department
                   Rochester, New York

     Effective leadership, or the lack of it, can impact
dramatically on organizations.  There have been many instances
when private organizations near bankruptcy, such as the Chrysler
Corporation, have become more efficient, effective organizations
by replacing ineffective administrations with competent, dynamic
leadership.  Similarly, successful military leaders have turned
ineffective military units into highly effective, motivated
    Unfortunately, however, police departments often do not
evaluate management practices until a crisis, such as a lawsuit,
serious accident, or public pressure caused by misconduct or
mismanagement, forces them to re-evaluate their positions.  This
type of crisis management in police organizations has been
disruptive and costly and has even threatened the existence of
some departments.

     The absence of good management practices in police
departments may be due, in some part, to the fact that it is
difficult to measure the effectiveness of police organizations.
However, a lack of measurable standards often allows ineffective
organizations, including police departments, to survive without
much change.

     Fortunately, however, the same leadership principles and
skills that turn around private organizations and military units
can be used to change police organizations and motivate
personnel.  This article discusses how some of today's
ineffective police practices evolved and what is needed to
change these management practices.  Various leadership styles
will also be discussed, as well as how effective disciplinary
measures can be taken when necessary.

POLICE LEADERSHIP PRACTICES                                       

     Certain ineffective police leadership practices that exist
today evolved from two sources--the authoritarian military style
of management and management practices used during and after the
Industrial Revolution to control unskilled factory laborers.
These autocratic practices were based on the assumption that
employees were basically lazy, and leaders believed that this
type of management was necessary to gain as much production as
possible from the labor force.

     Unethical political influences and corruption were also
factors in the early development of police leadership practices.
A strong chief executive was required to combat these problems.
This, along with the low education level of most officers and
the existence of a structure-oriented society, made the
authoritarian leadership style both  appropriate and effective.
However, authoritative leadership practices do not meet the
needs and expectations of today's better educated and more
technically competent police officers.

     For the most part, as society evolved, work ethics and
leadership styles changed.  Today, police officers are expected
to function effectively in a more sophisticated society, and as
a result, the education and prestige level of officers has
increased significantly.  Officers are not willing to accept
autocratic leadership that requires them to follow orders
without question.  This autocratic style of management not only
causes poor morale and reduced organizational effectiveness but
it also leads to the loss of quality personnel, who seek
employment elsewhere rather than being subjected to ineffective,
poor leadership.


     If police leadership is to improve, officials in the
department, from the chief executive down through the chain of
command, must be committed to change poor leadership practices
and values. (1)  They must master leadership skills, such as
patience, understanding, fairness, and judgment. (2)
Supervisors must also recognize that leadership is important to
successful management, and that past practices, such as public
criticism, tactlessness, and unfairness, are destructive to
organizations.  Instead, leaders should stress the importance of
consideration, caring, and loyalty.  Stressing the importance of
these values produces positive results, such as a higher degree
of employee motivation and morale.  This, in turn, may result in
more effective organizations.

     For example, loyalty, both to the supervisor and to the
employee, is important.  Some administrators expect loyalty from
employees; yet, they fail to show loyalty to the employees.
This is often demonstrated through their lack of trust or
confidence in their subordinates.  Some supervisors, when they
receive citizen complaints about their officers, automatically
assume the officers are guilty.  This seriously undermines
employee confidence in the supervisor's leadership ability.  It
also causes confusion and reduced performance in subordinates.
For these reasons, supervisors must presume that employees are
innocent of any wrongdoing until the facts prove otherwise.

     An important step in the commitment to change leadership
practices is to identify the various leadership styles and how
they impact on employee performance.  Studying leadership styles
also allows supervisors to identify their personal styles of
management and to make necessary changes in their management


     There are two basic leadership styles--job-oriented and
employee-oriented. (3)  Job-oriented leaders are primarily
concerned with tasks, and they rely on the formal power
structure and close supervision for task accomplishment.
Conversely, the employee-oriented leader is concerned with
maintaining good relations with subordinates.  Tasks are
delegated, and the leader is concerned with the employees'
personal growth.  Although one leadership style is not clearly
superior over the other, the employee-oriented leader generally
promotes higher morale in subordinates.  This results in lower
absenteeism and fewer employee grievances.  Employees of
job-oriented leaders generally produce less because they are
closely monitored and are not allowed to participate in
decisionmaking, which results in employee dissatisfaction.


     In "The Managerial Grid," authors Blake and Mouton
identified five styles of leadership:  Task management, country
club management, impoverished management, middle of the road
management, and team management. (4)  The "task management
supervisor" is concerned with achieving production goals by
planning, directing, and controlling subordinates' work, whereas
the "country club" management style stresses the importance of
good employee relations.  On the other hand, the "impoverished
management" supervisor attempts to maintain organizational
membership, while the "middle-of-the-road" manager attempts to
maintain both good employee relations and production.  And, the
"team manager" maintains a high degree of production through
integration of tasks with subordinate input and decision

     Of these five management styles, "team management" is
considered to be the most effective.  Leaders with this style of
management are able to build effective teams, solve problems,
resolve conflicts, and encourage employee development.

     Although a leader's basic management style is important, it
is equally important for the leader to adjust that style
according to existing circumstances.  This is referred to as
situational leadership.

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP                                      

     A good leader must be flexible, must adapt to a variety of
situations, and must have the ability to select the most
effective leadership style for any given situation.  While a
particular leadership style may be extremely effective in one
situation, it may be disastrous in another.  Other times, a
combination of styles may be necessary to provide the most
effective leadership.  The situational leader takes a
commonsense approach to leadership, with the focus on the leader
adapting to the follower's needs.

     According to Paul Hersey, author of "The Situational
Leader," a flexible leadership style should be based on the
particular employee's needs. (5)  There are four basic styles
that could meet these needs, including telling, selling,
participating, and delegating.

     The telling style is high task and low relations oriented.
This style has a greater probability of success when used with
new employees who have low readiness levels because of their
limited abilities and inexperience in performing tasks.

     On the other hand, when dealing with experienced,
motivated, or willing employees, leaders will find that the
delegating style has the greatest probability of success.  This
allows employees to participate in decisionmaking and gives them
a certain degree of independence.

     Correctly analyzing where employees are in terms of
readiness and the ability of leaders to remain flexible are
critical to the success of situational leaders.  Leaders should
first evaluate where the employee is in terms of both ability
and willingness to perform tasks.  Based on these two factors,
leaders can determine what management style would most likely be

     Hersey further suggests that leaders who work with groups
must also remain flexible.  This allows the leader to progress
from group supervisor to group leader as the group's readiness
level increases.

     Fillmore Sanford, author of "Authoritarism and Leadership," 
also believes that leadership style should be based on the 
employee's level of job maturity--the employee's ability to
perform a task. (6)  A new employee often lacks the training or
experience to function without assistance or close supervision.
As the employee matures by gaining experience and training, it
is possible for the leader to move from a task-oriented
management style to an employee-oriented management style.
Eventually, it may be possible for the leader to simply delegate
tasks to the employee.

     However, the rate and degree to which employees mature
varies, and not all employees will mature to the level of simply
being delegated tasks.  In order to choose the proper management
style, then, the leader needs to assess the employee's level of
maturity.  Choosing the wrong management style may result in the
incorrect amount of supervision.

     For example, in police organizations, the performance of
new officers must be monitored more closely.  They generally
lack self-confidence and need more feedback.  Seasoned veterans,
however, view this type of supervision as inappropriate because
they have gained job maturity through experience.


     There are three leadership traits associated with
leadership effectiveness--intelligence, personality, and
ability. (7)  Superior intelligence affects the leader's
judgment and decisiveness and allows the manager to make
correct, timely decisions.  Additionally, adaptable, creative,
confident leaders with integrity can influence and motivate
employees.  Tact and diplomacy are also important to gain
employee cooperation.

     Also found consistently in effective leadership are three
leadership dimensions:  The assumption of the leadership role,
the closeness of supervision, and being employee-oriented. (8)
To assume the leadership role, effective leaders need to plan,
delegate, communicate, and supervise.  However, close control by
the supervisor may result in lower employee productivity.  This
lack of employee freedom can prevent necessary decisions being
made at the lowest level possible and creates a lack of employee

     Additionally, the degree to which a supervisor cares about
subordinates has a significant impact on leadership
effectiveness.  If police department organizational practices
and procedures are designed to aid management at the expense of
employee safety, it sends the message that the officers are
expendable.  This creates resentment and alienates the officers.


     Disciplinary measures are necessary to ensure that
organizational standards of performance and conduct are met.
Both inappropriate discipline and the failure of management to
discipline can lower employee morale and can also lead to the
retention of unqualified or undesirable employees.

     Some employees will not respond to positive leadership
practices and motivational techniques.  Sound leadership
practices mandate the use of discipline only when all other
reasonable courses of action have failed; however, the negative
effects will be minimal if management is not indiscriminate and
if the administration of punishment is fair. (9)  Supervisors
must ensure that employees know what the standards are and that
those standards are not being met.  Employees must also be aware
of what disciplinary action will be taken for continued poor
performance.  Leaders, however, should ensure that employee
deficiencies are not the result of a lack of training.

     When a leader takes disciplinary action, it should be done
quickly and fairly.  This is critical in order to ensure that
there is as little adverse effect on organizational morale as
possible.  Leaders should always bear in mind that the objective
is to correct performance, not to teach employees to avoid

     Fairness and proper administration of the disciplinary
process are also critical to avoid legitimate complaints.
Leaders should also avoid the shift of focus from the issue of
performance to the issue of management's fairness.


     In some police agencies, administrators fail to implement a
fair promotion system, while in other agencies, administrators
try to circumvent systems already in place in order to promote
the officer of their choice.  For example, some administrators
fail to promote from an existing list of qualified officers, and
instead, wait for a new promotion list to be established in the
hopes a particular officer will be promotable.

     This type of leadership is demoralizing to the entire
department, and it reduces organizational effectiveness.
Officers soon learn that hard work, education, and good
performance are not the criteria on which promotions are based,
undermining everything leaders hope to accomplish. For this
reason, leaders must set the highest standard of integrity
possible when promoting officers.


     In many police organizations, especially poorly managed
departments, the leadership philosophy is to control the officer
rather than encourage team building.  When this type of
leadership exists within departments, it becomes increasingly
difficult to retain officers.  Leaders within police departments
must, therefore, shift their emphasis from employee control to
employee team building, and they must involve officers at every
level in decisionmaking.  They must also work to develop the
traits found in effective leaders, and they should study
effective leadership styles.

     Sound leadership knowledge and practices are critical to
effective police organizations.  Dynamic leadership can lead to
progressive, highly successful, and innovative departments.  It
is only through this type of leadership that departments will
meet both the demands of today and the challenges of the future.


     (1)  James B. Lau and A.B. Shani, "Behavior in
Organizations" (Homewood, Illinois:  BPI Irwin, 1988), pp.

     (2)  B.M. Bass and Roger M. Stogdill, "Handbook of
Leadership" (New York, New  York:  Free Press, 1982).

     (3)  R. Likert, "New Patterns of Management" (New York, New
York:  McGraw-Hill, 1961).

     (4)  Robert Blake and Jane S. Mouton, "The Managerial Grid"
(Houston, Texas:  Gulf Publishing, 1964).

     (5)  Paul Hersey, "The Situational Leader" (New York, New
York: Warner Books).

     (6)  Fillmore H. Sanford, "Authoritarism and Leadership"
(Philadelphia Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1950).

     (7)  Supra note 2, pp. 75-76.                                   

     (8)  David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield, and Egerton
Ballachy, "Individual and Society" (New York:  McGraw-Hill,
1962), pp.  472-473.

     (9)  James Gibson, John Ivancevich, and James Donnelly,
Jr., "Organizations Behavior Structure Process" (Homewood,
Illinois: BPI Irwin, 1988), pp. 210-211.

[Law] Counter-Intelligence Challenges in a Changing World

September 1991                                                    



                       William S. Sessions
                 Federal Bureau of Investigation     
     In recent years, the world witnessed some truly amazing
events--the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of
East and West Germany, the beginnings of democratic governments
across Eastern Europe, and the easing of political tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  As a result,
the current perception of most Americans is that foreign
intelligence activity directed against the United States and the
West is decreasing, and therefore, the need for an active,
aggressive counterintelligence response has abated.
Unfortunately, this is far from true.

     There can be no doubt that important changes are taking
place in the world today.  However, improved diplomatic
relations do not necessarily decrease the foreign intelligence
threat to U.S. national security.  The truth remains: That
threat still exists, as it did in the past and as it will in the


     The last decade of the cold war, the 1980s, was designated
by the media as "The Decade of the Spy."  It was a time when
Americans knew who their enemies were--a time when President
Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as "The Evil Empire."
The American public showed strong support of counterintelligence
efforts and participated in the process by reporting suspicious

     During the 1980s, more than 45 people were arrested for
espionage.  Increased human and technical resources, enhanced
analytical and training programs, and improved coordination
within the U.S. intelligence community and with friendly foreign
intelligence services contributed significantly to these
arrests.  However, much of the success in counterintelligence
efforts came as a result of a heightened public awareness of the
full damage caused by espionage, as well as the public's support
of the measures designed to protect Americas vital information.

     In addition to the importance of public awareness, the
1980s taught us several other important lessons.  First, the
American public received a rude awakening regarding the
vulnerability of the U.S. national security community from spies
within its own ranks.  For example, both John Walker and Jerry
Whitworth served in the U.S. Navy; Karel Koecher, Larry Chin,
and Edward Howard all worked for the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA); Ronald Pelton was a National Security Agency employee;
Richard Miller was an FBI Special Agent.

     Second, many of the dangers were posed by volunteers.  That
is, many of those arrested during the 1980s, including Walker,
simply offered to spy on their country.  And they offered to spy
not because they had ideological differences with the U.S.
Government or ideological sympathy with a foreign government, as
was the case during World War II and the first decade of the
Cold War.  They spied for the basest of reasons--money.

     Third, prosecuting spies was found to be an effective tool
to determine the extent of the damage caused to national
security.  Unfortunately, some of the espionage cases of the
1980s resulted in grave damage to U.S. national security
interests.  But, without the prosecutions that followed, an
accurate accounting of what was lost would not have been
possible, and appropriate steps to minimize the damage would not
have been taken.  Fortunately, in 45 percent of the espionage
cases during the 1980s, the work the U.S. counterintelligence
community uncovered either prevented the espionage activity or
significantly limited the  damages.


     In the 1990s, with the easing of tensions between
superpowers and military blocs, it is no longer possible to
identify the U.S. counterintelligence mission in terms of these
relationships alone--the world has become much too complex for
that.  America has negotiated historic arms reduction treaties
with the Soviets.  The Soviets have introduced their programs of
Glasnost, openness to the West, and Perestroika, internal
economic and political restructuring.  And, the world has
witnessed the nations of Eastern Europe revolt against their
former Communist leaders in favor of new freedom and economic
diversity, and in some  cases, more democratic forms of

     While all Americans can agree that the world has changed,
and most see that change as positive in terms of an enhanced
prospect for world peace, the public tends to view this new
world order to be devoid of danger.  So, the logic goes, that if
there is no longer a threat to U.S. national security, then
counterintelligence measures are not needed.

     But, the reality is that arms reduction treaties between
the United States and the Soviet Union give Soviet "inspectors"
potential access to some of this country's most sensitive
projects.  Glasnost has dramatically expanded the number of
exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in such
areas as business, science, and education.  In fact, since
Glasnost, the number of Soviets traveling to the United States
increased almost 400 percent; in 1990 alone, more than 100,000
Soviets visited the United States.  Past experience shows that
these exchange groups often contain intelligence officers.
Furthermore, the countries of Eastern Europe, while attempting
to move away from the Soviet sphere of influence, are now
fighting for their own economic survival--and they, too, have a
need for Western technology.


     Arms control treaties between the Soviet Union and the
United States will hopefully lead to a diminished threat level
between the nations.  However, from a counterintelligence
perspective, these treaties will give the Soviet intelligence
services routine access to sensitive areas and to knowledgeable
Americans who are linked to classified information which, until
now, was attainable only on a very limited basis.  Other
treaties presently being negotiated, concerning strategic arms
reduction and chemical weapons, would require numerous
verification sites, again expanding Soviet access.

     But, the Soviets are interested in more than American
military secrets.  The Soviet economy is in desperate shape and
can be revitalized with Western technology, capital, and
expertise.  In order to strengthen that economy, the chairman of
the KGB has publicly stated that it plans to assist Soviet
businesses because, as he says, "They are not good businessmen."
The Soviets have systematically expanded their intelligence
collection beyond military intelligence targets and now
routinely include Western economic information and technologies.

     Since the Soviets can no longer rely on their former
surrogate intelligence services in the Eastern Bloc to collect
intelligence for them, they must find other sources of
intelligence and develop new surrogate services.  The Soviets
have started using the intelligence services of other countries
to obtain Stealth technology and acquire restricted computer
technologies for themselves.

     Recent repression by the Soviet government of dissent in
the Baltic Republics may very well signal a new shift in Soviet
internal policy away from the liberalization of Glasnost.  This,
in turn, may have far-reaching implications involving the Soviet
military and its intelligence services, U.S. national security,
and the emerging "new world order."

     All in all, while the nature of the Soviet intelligence
threat may be changing, its objectives and actions are not.  The
Soviet intelligence services are more active now than they have
been at any time in the past 10 years, and there is every reason
to believe that they will continue their pursuit of Western
intelligence during the 1990s.

     The threat of Eastern European countries to the United
States cannot be fully assessed because they themselves have not
yet fully defined the nature and scope of their intelligence
services.  Some of these countries are no longer collecting
intelligence on behalf of the Soviet Union; however, they will,
in all likelihood, refocus their collection activities in the
United States to fulfill their own requirements.  Since, as with
the Soviets, the current major focus of these nations is
economic reorganization and growth, they also have a real need
for Western technology.

     What about the People's Republic of China (PRC)?  The PRC
has the largest foreign official presence in the United
States--2,700 diplomats and commercial officials, 43,000
scholars, 25,000 commercial delegates visiting the United States
annually, and 20,000 emigres coming to America each year.  The
PRC remains a major counterintelligence threat to the United
States.  Their intelligence services target well-educated
Chinese-American scientists and other professionals who have
access to useful information and technology using the approach:
"Please help China modernize."

     While the Soviet Union, the former Eastern Bloc countries,
and the People's Republic of China are all traditional
intelligence threats, U.S. counterintelligence efforts can no
longer focus exclusively on these countries.  In this
information age, any number of countries can attempt to
establish the infrastructure required to carry out intelligence
collection activities in the United States, both overtly and
clandestinely.  Essentially, Americans need to be concerned
about nontraditional intelligence threats to this country as

     With this point in mind, the intelligence activities of
countries in the Middle East and Central Asia are becoming more
significant.  For example, the Iraqi intelligence service was
very active in the United States during the 1980s, and in light
of the recent war in the Persian Gulf, its activities are likely
to continue.


     The FBI is charged with countering the hostile activities
of foreign intelligence services in the United States by
identifying and neutralizing these activities.  It does this by
penetrating these services, disrupting or publicizing their
illegal activities, and expelling, arresting, or prosecuting
those responsible.

     However, the FBI cannot meet its counterintelligence
mission alone.  Coordination of counterintelligence operations
with other members of the intelligence community, and frequently
joint operations, is critical to the Bureau's success, along
with the support of the Executive and Legislative Branches of
the Federal Government, the law enforcement community, and the
American public.

     While the FBI has the responsibility to make the public
more aware of the hostile intelligence threat, it relies heavily
on information from the public to fulfill its
counterintelligence mission.  Because many Americans no longer
perceive the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries
as a threat to U.S. security, the FBI must comprehensively
expose the full scope of this threat to American institutions,
facilities, and citizens.  The purpose behind this is to protect
national security, not to discourage improved relations and
trade between the United States and the rest of the world.


     The world is in a constant state of flux.  What is true
today may not be true tomorrow.  For this reason, it is
critical to identify the exact nature of any hostile
intelligence threat to national security and to counter that

     A heightened awareness by all Americans is the most
effective weapon available to accomplish this task.  By working
together, citizens and law enforcement agencies can successfully
meet the counterintelligence challenges of today and those of
the years to come.

[Law] A Continuing Challenge for Law Enforcement

September 1991                                                    


                       Otis E. Cooksey                                     
                Major, Military Police Advisor
                  U.S. Army Readiness Group
                   Fort Sam Houston, Texas                         
     All too frequently, the public's confidence in law
enforcement is shaken by reports of officers falling victim to
corruption.  While no profession is untouched by corruption, its
effect on law enforcement is especially damaging.  As guardians
of law and order in a free society, law enforcement officers
must maintain a consistently high standard of integrity.

     Combating crime claims many victims from the ranks of law
enforcement.  As criminals become more violent, increasing
numbers of officers are being killed or injured in the line of
duty.  But increasing numbers of officers are also being lost to
corruption.  The lure of fast money associated with the drug
trade and other temptations are creating new and potentially
devastating problems for police departments and law enforcement
managers across the country.

     While there is no proven approach to eliminate all
corruption, there is an emerging understanding that an effective
strategy must begin with recruitment and continue into training.
In addition, a procedure should be instituted to investigate
charges of police misconduct within an agency.  To combat
corruption successfully, police managers must acknowledge that
it is a serious threat to the organization, and they must work
to reduce its damaging effects.


     The key to any effort aimed at preventing corruption in a
law enforcement agency is acknowledging that corruption, or the
potential for corruption, exists.  Given the current environment
wherein drug dealers regularly transact business while carrying
more cash than an officer makes in a year, law enforcement
managers can no longer ignore the issue of corruption.

     For the most part, managers use three general approaches
when failing to deal with corruption.  First, managers attempt
the "ostrich" approach, denying the existence of a problem.  As
a result of this approach, when the manager is faced with an
allegation of corruption, there is no effective mechanism in
place to deal with the problem.  This may force the manager into
courses of action directed by those outside the department.

     Second, managers try to deal with corruption by taking a
"pollyanna" approach.  Here, the manager acknowledges that
corruption exists in the organization, but downplays its impact.
Again, in a situation where the manager fails to respond
effectively to an incident, the course of action may be directed
from outside the agency.

     The third, and potentially most damaging, approach occurs
when a manager responds to corruption with a "cover-up."  Here,
the manager not only acknowledges corruption in the organization
but also takes overt action to cover it up.  This tactic
violates the special trust and confidence society places in law
enforcement and establishes a climate in the agency for
corruption to flourish.

     Fortunately, the law enforcement manager can overcome the
shortfalls of these approaches by taking a more-realistic
approach to corruption.  To respond effectively to corruption,
the manager must acknowledge the devastating impact it can have
on an agency.  A manager with a realistic appreciation of the
potential effects of corruption is in a position to develop a
strategy to deal with corruption internally.  This will enable
the department to minimize the damaging effects of the


     Once the manager is committed to preventing corruption, the
next step is developing a policy before a crisis situation
develops.  While no one policy will meet the needs of all law
enforcement agencies, any effective policy should cover
recruitment, training, and investigation. (1)

     Before an effective strategy can be established, however,
the manager must decide on a suitable definition of corruption.
Arthur Niederhoffer defines corruption to include activities
ranging from the acceptance of a free cup of coffee to the
actual commission of criminal acts. (2)  But, including acts on
such a wide continuum creates a potential problem for the
manager.  The dilemma is whether to include this whole range of
activities in the policy or to draw a line on the continuum to
mark when seemingly innocent acts become corrupt.

     The problem for those managers who attempt to "draw the
line" or separate degrees of corruption will be the tendency
toward interpretation and rationalization.  Managers faced with
complex situations must then try to decide on which side of the
line an act falls.  At the same time, officers serving under
this policy can rationalize their actions, and given a healthy
imagination, one can rationalize almost any action.

     The alternative to defining specific corrupt acts is the
approach adopted by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP), which established a definition of corruption by
using the intended results of an action, not by the specific
acts.(3)  The IACP defines corruption as acts involving the
misuse of authority by a police officer in a manner designed to
produce either personal gain or gain for others.  This approach
simplifies the managers role in identifying corrupt actions and
provides officers with a simple way of determining where their
actions fall in relation to agency policy.

     The Model for Management-Corruption Prevention, prepared by
the IACP, is an effective tool to aid the law enforcement
manager in preparing a corruption prevention policy.  This model
policy covers the key aspects of a corruption prevention
strategy--recruitment, training, and investigation.  This model
can also be tailored to the specific needs of departments,
regardless of size.



     As Edwin J. Delattre notes in his book, "Character and
Cops," people do not just happen to wear badges.  They wear
badges because police managers recruit and hire them. (4)  It is
only commonsense, then, that a comprehensive corruption
prevention policy address recruitment.  No agency knowingly
hires people who will commit corrupt acts in the future.  Yet,
many departments suffer the devastating effects of corruption.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department discharges
approximately 20 officers a year, primarily as a result of
misconduct. (5)

     There are, of course, many reasons why police agencies
should screen recruits and eliminate those who may become
corrupt.  One important factor is money.  For all agencies,
training is an expensive resource that cannot be wasted.  If an
officer completes training and then commits corrupt acts, the
department faces a potentially more complex and more serious
problem, mainly because rehabilitation and disciplinary actions
are more difficult and expensive the longer an individual is
employed. (6)  Law enforcement managers should be alert for
signs indicating trouble during the recruitment, initial
training, and probationary periods.

     An additional concern for departments in the coming years
is the declining number of qualified recruit applicants.
Reasons for this include low pay and the deteriorated image of
law enforcement.  Other factors include the increased demand for
police officers nationwide and a declining trend in the
population of 18 to 25 year olds. (7)

     A model that may assist recruitment managers is the
Standards Manual of the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation
Program.  This model stresses the following guidelines:

     *  The department should advertise broadly for candidates
        and not restrict recruiting to its own jurisdiction,

     *  The department should have trained personnel conduct a
        written background investigation of every eligible
        candidate.  In some cases, the polygraph may be used as
        an investigative tool,

     *  The department should have trained personnel conduct an
        oral interview of each candidate, and also test the
        candidate's general health, physical fitness and agility,
        emotional stability, and psychological fitness,

     *  The department should require all candidates to complete
        at least a 6-month probationary period and entry-level
        training.  (8) 

While this model may not be suitable for every agency, the
principles described provide a guide for managers to include
recruitment as part of an anticorruption strategy.


     Training provides the best and most powerful tool for
making a corruption prevention strategy work.  Training
conducted in an integrated and realistic manner is an effective
deterrent to corruption for two reasons.  First, training
publicizes agency policy.  A policy that is merely written but
not disseminated widely and regularly is likely to be
ineffective.  Second, training allows officers the opportunity
to interact and request clarification of standards of conduct in
terms of specific actions commonly encountered in police work.

     In most agencies today, training is separated into two
categories--recruit and inservice.  Corruption prevention
indoctrination logically begins during recruit training and
should be integrated into as many subject areas as possible by
the academy instructors.  This approach is effective for two
reasons.  First, this will incorporate corruption prevention
standards into the enforcement of laws and regulations.  Second,
the instructors, usually veteran police officers, have built a
rapport and have the respect of the students.  They, along with
the chaplain, can establish a solid foundation for the new
officers to resist corruption.

     The second phase of the training process is the inservice
training that officers receive during their careers.  Inservice
training provides a department with a mechanism to reinforce the
standards of corruption prevention.

     Law enforcement managers have several options when planning
inservice training.  Many colleges and universities have courses
in sociology, psychology, religion, and management that will
reinforce and supplement corruption prevention strategies.  In
addition, expert consultants can be contracted to develop
corruption prevention training programs.

     Although academically engaging and easy to institute,
neither of these approaches may be as effective and complete as
a program developed within the agency.  The Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department is an example of an agency that decided to
create its own training program to combat corruption.

     Using its own personnel and based on an assessment of the
problem, the sheriff's department designed a program that
covered the following:

     *  Discussions of different ethical dilemmas, preceded by a 
        review of several problem situations,                             

     *  Issues of concern, an overview of misconduct cases in
        the department,

     *  Standards for decision-making,                               

     *  Rationalization, and                                         

     *  Situational planning                                         

     One of the strengths of this program is that it allows open  
discussion of problem areas and  standards of performance 
required by the agency.  It integrates real-life law enforcement 
issues with the expected standards of conduct.            


     The last, and possibly most difficult, phase of a
corruption prevention strategy to implement is the investigation
of police misconduct.  However, an effective investigation
policy must be established or the other elements of the strategy
lose their effectiveness.  Through objective investigation of
all possible incidents involving misconduct, a police agency can
foster a sense of confidence and credibility with the public.

     Most agencies approach the investigation process by forming
an internal affairs unit.  To assist in this endeavor, the IACP
developed a model that can be used by police departments. (9)
This model covers the various issues that should be considered
when forming this special unit.

     The first task for the manager is staffing.  In large
departments, several full-time officers may work solely in the
internal affairs unit.  In small departments, the unit may
consist of one officer, operating on an as-needed basis.
Another viable alternative for the small department is to pool
resources with other local agencies as situations require.

     After the unit is staffed, the manager must decide where to
place the internal affairs unit in the organization.  Ideally,
the unit will report directly to the chief or ranking officer of
the agency.  The manager should provide clear, comprehensive
directives outlining the procedures for dealing with complaints
coming from both inside and outside the agency.

     The manager should also ensure that the unit investigates
all complaints quickly and impartially.  The internal affairs
unit does not determine guilt or innocence; it merely gathers
facts concerning the complaint that should be well-documented.
This documentation will ultimately benefit both the officer
involved and the public, in the case of an external complaint.

     The establishment of an effective internal affairs unit
reinforces proper police conduct, as well as ensures the public
of effective and honest police service.  The existence of an
internal affairs unit in the agency structure tells the public
and police officers that the department is willing to "police
the police" and supports the overall corruption prevention


     Corruption can destroy the special bond of trust between
law enforcement and the public.  Citizens in a free society
expect law enforcement officers to perform their duties with a
high standard of integrity.  When corruption occurs, not only is
the bond between police and public strained, but citizen
cooperation, on which law enforcement depends, can be

     In order to combat corruption effectively, law enforcement
managers must first acknowledge the potential for corruption and
appreciate the devastating effects it can have on their
agencies.  The key elements of a corruption prevention strategy
should integrate agency policy into recruitment, training, and
thorough investigation of all alleged corruption.

     While corruption has always been a factor in law
enforcement, the need for effective corruption prevention
strategies has never been stronger.  Today's officers face more
violent criminals and more potential temptations.  Law
enforcement must present a unified front against an increasingly
sophisticated criminal element.  It is important that managers
provide today's officers with proper corruption prevention


     (1)  John D. Glover, "Maintaining Police Integrity:
Federal Police of the United States," Police Studies, Spring
1986, p.  24.

     (2)  Sanford H. Kadish, "Corruption," Encyclopedia of Crime
and Justice, 1983, p. 1161.

     (3)  International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Models
for Management--Corruption Prevention," Police Chief, May 1989,
p.  60.

     (4)  Edwin J. Delattre, Character and Cops (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1989), p. 117.

     (5)  Duane T. Preimsberger and Sherman Block, "Values,
Standards and Integrity in Law Enforcement:  An Emphasis of Job
Survival," Journal of California Law Enforcement, January 1987,
p. 10.

     (6)  Supra note 4, p. 119.                                      

     (7)  Bruce W. Cameron, "Where Will We Get New Recruits?"
Law and Order, September 1989, p. 3.

     (8)  Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies, Inc., "Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies:  The
Standards Manual of the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation
Program," 1984, pp. 31-32.

     (9)  International Association of Chiefs of  Police, "The
Disciplinary Process: Internal Affairs Role," Training Key #
228, undated.